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‘No, niente appello!’: How De Gasperi sent Guareschi to prison
[The Italianist, n. 25, 2005, ii: 239-259]
Alan R. Perry
Non capisco perché debbano fare la perizia, giacché mio marito ha affermato di non
aver mai scritto quei documenti. (Francesca De Gasperi)
De Gasperi lo querelò. Ne scaturì un processo in cui, però, nonostante le formali
assicurazioni, non fu ammessa la perizia grafica sulle lettere in possesso di Guareschi.
Esse vennero considerate false sulla base della parola di De Gasperi. (Antonio Di
Pietro)
Per rimanere liberi, bisogna a un bel momento prendere, senza esitare, la via della
prigione. (Giovannino Guareschi)
No one could have suspected the political bombshell Candido editor Giovannino
Guareschi dropped on the Italian political scene in early 1954. As it occurred, it almost
seemed like something that belonged to the Mondo Piccolo, the imaginary world
Guareschi created that had brought him untold commercial and popular success. Indeed,
in the realm of Don Camillo and Peppone, inflammatory accusations were daily
occurrences. But this claim seemed to go beyond what anyone had reasonably come to
expect from Guareschi’s caustic pen that lampooned the real world of Italian Cold War
society and politics. In 1948 Guareschi had stood fast with then Prime Minister Alcide
De Gasperi to defeat the Popular Front. Six years later, any semblance of continuity
between the inveterate allied enemies of Communism came to an abrupt end.
Guareschi accused De Gasperi of having asked the Allies during World War II to
bomb the periphery of Rome in order to incite a popular insurrection against the
Germans. He backed his claim with a photocopied letter that carried De Gasperi’s
signature. Soon thereafter, he published another missive, this time entirely written in De
Gasperi’s hand. The former Prime Minister brought a criminal suit against Guareschi for
his inflammatory commentary that accompanied the letters. The April trial lasted four
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days and captivated the nation. In the end, a Milan tribunal found Guareschi guilty of
libel. Incensed by what he experienced as a lack of justice, Guareschi refused to appeal.
He spent the next fourteen months in a Parma prison.
Unfortunately, misconceptions about the case began to form immediately after the
verdict, and over time they have become crystallized as part of the official record.
Numerous historians, literary critics, and journalists believe the court condemned
Guareschi not for libel but for having published false documents, a judgment that, in
reality, the court never decided. For example, the Storia della Democrazia Cristiana
(1988), documents the case in this manner:
Si trattava, in realtà, di un falso che faceva parte di un gruppo di lettere apocrife, che
comprendeva anche un carteggio tra Churchill e Mussolini, da tempo offerte in vendita ad
imprese editoriali e perfino al governo dietro richiesta di compensi vari (tra i quali
amnistie, licenze d'importazione ecc.). De Gasperi sporse querela contro il direttore del
Candido. Il processo, che si svolse a Milano dal 13 al 15 aprile 1954, riuscì a provare la
falsità del documento pubblicato e costò a Guareschi la condanna ad un anno di carcere.1
Other misunderstandings exist as to how the court came to its decision and what
motivated Guareschi not to seek an appeal.
It is time to set the historical record straight. A close examination of the official
proceedings of De Gasperi v. Guareschi will show how enough misplaced discredit has
been strewn upon Guareschi’s memory to warrant a revision of facts. A study of the
case’s intricacies will also shed light upon the sway that De Gasperi’s moral stature had
upon the Italian judiciary in the early 1950s. As such, to begin our inquiry and
comprehend the proceedings in full, we must first appreciate both Guareschi’s evolving
relationship with De Gasperi and the history behind the two documents Guareschi used to
disparage his adversary. In the process, we will better appreciate why by January 1954
Guareschi considered the former prime minister as Italy’s greatest enemy.2
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I. Disenchantment with De Gasperi and coming to possess letters in Mussolini’s
dossier
When Guareschi founded Candido in 1946, still adjusting from his World War II
experience of twenty-one months as a German prisoner of war, he staunchly supported
the retention of the monarchy. Although he felt bitter when the referendum sent King
Umberto II and his family into exile, he resolved to pour his energies into defeating the
Popular Front. Guareschi loathed Communism, fearing that its political philosophy
robbed people of their capacity to think freely for themselves. He also harbored
misgivings about the power of the Christian Democrat Party (DC), but he found a staunch
ally in the anti-Communist Alcide De Gasperi. For Guareschi, De Gasperi had been the
principal statesman who had forged the Republic in the precarious times of the
dopoguerra [Reconstruction], and for this achievement he had earned Guareschi’s
respect. He referred to De Gasperi as ‘l’uomo politico più intelligente d’Europa, dopo
Churchill’.3
Together with De Gasperi, Guareschi played an important role in defeating the
Popular Front (the Socialist-Communist coalition) in 1948. His anti-Communist satire in
Candido gripped reader attention, and two influential political posters that he designed
were plastered on walls and kiosks throughout the Italian peninsula.4 Life magazine
reported that two men, De Gasperi and Guareschi, had primarily won the Italian
elections.5 In time, however, the growing might of the DC began to worry Guareschi,
who saw its power as potentially capable of unduly commanding the will of the Italian
people. He firmly disliked how the DC took advantage of its favored status with the
Church, and he often exhorted the party not to foment confusion among the electorate
concerning the distinction between the two.6
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Over the course of 1952 Guareschi grew despondent with the DC and its
leadership, believing that the promised political reforms they championed never
materialized.7 More and more, Guareschi distanced himself from the DC and gave public
support to the Monarch Party. The definitive break with De Gasperi — at the time no
longer the Prime Minister — occurred with the fall of the Pella government. As the pages
of Candido reveal, Guareschi believed that De Gasperi had instigated a sneaky,
underhanded vote of no confidence for Pella since he had moved too far to the Right. In
this vein, De Gasperi purportedly toppled a leader of his own party because he wanted
Mario Scelba to preside as Prime Minister, a biased move that would better enhance his
own chances at becoming President of the Republic.
Infuriated at this supposedly unscrupulous maneuver, Guareschi saw De Gasperi
as a stealthy political sharpshooter who knocks off adversaries with ruthless
determination and accurate aim. Thus, in the 24 January 1954 edition of Candido,
Guareschi entitled an invective against De Gasperi ‘Il Ta-pum del cecchino’, recalling to
mind the popular song from World War I about the lethality of sharpshooters. The article
proved to be the most provocative of Guareschi’s career, an essay of tremendous
consequences. In it, Guareschi claimed that De Gasperi had been duplicitous to the point
of treachery.
To prove his point, he reproduced a letter De Gasperi had presumably written
during World War II from the Vatican, where he had gained asylum. The missive, written
on Vatican letterhead and dated 19 January 1944, was addressed to the English
Lieutenant Colonel Bonham Carter and read:
Egregio signor Colonnello, non avendo ricevuto alcun riscontro in merito alla mia
ultima del 12 gennaio ’44, mi permetto di trascriverle interamente il contenuto della
precedente, rimasta fino ad oggi senza esito.
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Tramite un corriere P.O. affidiamo la presente contenene la nostra più ampia
assicurazione che quanto S.E. il Generale ALEXANDER desidera venga effettuato,
come azione collaterale da parte dei nostri gruppi Patrioti, sarà scrupolosamente attuato.
Ci è purtuttavia doloroso, ma necessario, insistere nuovamente affinché la
popolazione romana si decida ad insorgere al nostro fianco, che non devono essere
risparmiate azioni di bombardamento nella zona periferica della città nonché sugli
obbiettivi militari segnalati.
Questa azione, che a cuore stretto invochiamo, è la sola che potrà infrangere
l’ultima resistenza morale del popolo romano, se particolarmente verrà preso, quale
obbiettivo, l’acquedotto, punto nevralgico vitale.
Ci urge inoltre, e nel più breve tempo possibile il già sollecitato rifornimento,
essendo giunti allo stremo.
La preghiamo pertanto, nel più breve tempo possibile di assicurarci di tutto, e di
credere nella nostra immutabile fede nella lotta contro il comune nemico nazi-fascista.
Degasperi8
Guareschi also referenced how a handwriting expert had deemed the letter was genuine, a
declaration subsequently validated by a notaio [public notary]. He knew the seriousness
of the charge and clearly wanted his readers to know what authentication process had led
him to publish the letters.
What really stung Guareschi was not that De Gasperi had requested that the Allies
bomb Rome, but that he had passed himself off as an official representative of the
Vatican by using the letterhead in order to give weight to his request. As Guareschi
commented: ‘Non è un gesto incosciente e stolto: è un vero e proprio sacrilegio. Non è un
semplice gesto di uno che tradisce l’ospitalità, è il gesto nefando di un cattolico che
tradisce il Santo Padre’.9 Thus, for Guareschi, the letter proved that De Gasperi would
seek to achieve his political ends by any means necessary. If he could take advantage of
one supranational entity, what could he do to his own political party or to the nation
itself? Guareschi exploded: ‘Freddo, spietato, privo di ogni scrupolo, feroce, se occorre,
De Gasperi è in questo particolare momento l’uomo più pericoloso che l’Italia si possa
trovare alle costole’.10
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The allegations could not have come at a more inopportune time. The political
climate in the early 1950s, shaped so powerfully by the dominant Christian Democrats
and the Church, allowed little room for caustic opposition. In many respects, the DC
leadership felt threatened by a possible loss of power and efficacy.11 A few months prior
to Guareschi’s accusations, the government had cracked down hard on film critics Renzo
Renzi and Guido Aristarco, arresting them for ‘vilipendio delle Forze Armate’ because
they had published in Cinema Nuovo a condemnation of the Italian campaign in Greece.12
The DC leadership was simply hypersensitive to criticism.13
Of course, in excoriating De Gasperi for an alleged political ploy, Guareschi
seemed reckless and foolhardy, naive at best, for in the collective imagination of the early
1950s, De Gasperi was anything but a villain. Generally considered as the father of the
Italian Republic, he had no plausible rival. He had uncannily managed successive
coalitions, negotiated a favorable peace treaty, and kept the Communists out of
government. Guareschi went after a public icon at a time when his character was above
reproach.
From Rome, De Gasperi reacted swiftly, issuing a press release denying the
accusation, explaining that he had previously seen a counterfeited letter on Vatican
letterhead with his signature. Obviously, he claimed, it had come back into public
circulation.14 The following day he repeated his denial, explaining that he had earlier
rejected attempts by blackmailers who had approached him with purportedly
compromising documents; now these usurers had found a gullible buyer in Guareschi. 15
The counter-campaign started, and the Catholic press began to rail against Guareschi. Il
Popolo for example called him ‘disonesto, cinicamente bugiardo, ciecamente
disumano’.16
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For his part, Guareschi had not finished his assault. A week later, accompanied by
the same attestations of authenticity, he published another note, this time entirely
handwritten and not under a letterhead. It seemed as though the first letter had never
reached its destination, for it read:
Carissimo,
Spero di ottenere da Salerno il colpo di grazia. Avrete presto gli aiuti chiesti.
Coraggio, avanti e sempre, per la Santa Battaglia, auguri buon lavoro e fede.
26 Gen. ’44
Degasperi17
Guareschi also for the first time gave a hint that he was aware how grave the charges
were, indicating that he had to follow his conscience in sustaining his claims in the face
of a justice system about to bring its full weight down upon him. He stated: ‘Io bado
molto alla mia coscienza; preferirei essere condannato dalla Giustizia ed essere assolto
dalla mia coscienza piuttosto che essere assolto dalla Giustizia ed essere condannato dalla
mia coscienza. Io so che in questa vicenda il vero imputato non sono io, è De Gasperi. E
la parte lesa è la Nazione’.18
The accusations and rebuttals between the two highly visible public figures
became a public sensation, especially after De Gasperi formally brought suit against
Guareschi for libel on 6 February 1954. The occasion actually marked the second time in
Guareschi’s life that he faced such charges. Three years earlier an appellate court had
given him a suspended sentence of eight months for a series of vignettes that lampooned
President Luigi Einaudi.19 In the present case, if the court found him guilty, he was sure to
receive in full the reinstated penalty of the earlier ruling. Guareschi, however, pressed
ahead, supremely sure of himself.
His confidence stemmed from an encounter he had with Enrico De Toma, a
former Republic of Salò officer and Mussolini aide-de-camp. De Toma had convinced
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Guareschi that at the end of World War II the Duce had given him a dossier to secure in
Switzerland; it contained documents that the Duce wanted published five years from that
time should he happened to be killed. Thus, after several failed attempts to sell the
documents in the dossier to either the media or government officials, De Toma sought out
Guareschi and the forum of Candido.20 Once in possession of the letters, Guareschi went
to a handwriting expert, Umberto Focaccia, who vouched their authenticity. When a
public notary, Bruno Stamm, certified Focaccia’s competence, Guareschi felt most
optimistic that the letters were genuine and part of a more complete series of letters and
memoranda that belonged to a dossier Mussolini had supposedly spirited to Switzerland
during the waning days of the Republic of Salò.
The mystery surrounding the existence of documents Mussolini kept, many of
which detail his allegedly secret relationship with Winston Churchill, has piqued
scholarly and popular interest since the end of the war and sparked lively debate. Emilio
Re in Storia di un archivio provided one of the first historical studies of the various
dossiers found among Mussolini’s private and official archives after the war but does not
spend great length surmising if Churchill and Mussolini maintained a secret
correspondence. Other works that treat the story of the purported dossier include Peter
Tompkin’s Dalle carte segrete del Duce, Renzo De Felice’s Rosso e nero, Arrigo
Petacco’s Dear Benito, caro Winston, and two works by Fabio Andriola, MussoliniChurchill: Carteggio segreto and Appuntamento sul lago. Tompkins holds that the
dossier did exist, that Churchill had specifically sought to recover it, and that it was
eventually returned to the British government in the 1950s. De Felice believes that many
documents found in Switzerland written by Mussolini are authentic, but that the letters
Guareschi published were most likely false. Andriola and Petacco hold a similar position,
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stating that many of Mussolini’s documents are genuine but that among those presented
by De Toma some are forgeries.
Furthermore, as Petacco recounts, journalist Ferruccio Lanfranchi first published
a long article for the Corriere della Sera on 31 March 1950 and later a second dated 17
April 1951 that attempted to establish the dossier’s existence and itinerary. Guareschi
explained in Candido that Lanfranchi’s second article had caught his eye, and that he had
begun to follow stories concerning the alleged file over the span of three years.21 Once De
Toma had given him the letters which were subsequently authenticated, he believed that
he was legally obliged to consider the notes bona fide because of the avowal provided by
the perito calligrafico [the handwriting expert].22
The court case was set to begin on 13 April 1954 under the auspices of a Milanese
tribunal. Guareschi had two capable defenders, Vincenzo Porzio and Michele Learner,
and he assumed that the court would appoint calligraphy experts able to determine that
the missives were legitimate. For his part, De Gasperi made a shrewd tactical move in
appointing Giacomo Delitala as legal counsel and head of the prosecutorial team: Delitala
had intimate knowledge of his adversary since he himself had defended Guareschi in the
Einaudi case three years earlier. The actual proceedings provided many surprises.

II. The Case and Guareschi’s Attempts at Defense:
De Gasperi had charged Guareschi on two counts: first with libel and second for
knowingly having published false documents. Initially presenting Guareschi’s defense,
Lerner petitioned the court to consider determining the latter charge first rather than
proceed with the former.23 In theory, he surmised, if Guareschi could prove that the letters
were indeed authentic by way of chemical and handwriting analysis, this would render
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the first charge untenable. If Guareschi’s damning words about De Gasperi’s character
were based on genuine and not counterfeit documents, it would have been impossible for
him to have libeled De Gasperi because he would effectively have been speaking the
truth. Once Guareschi proved the letters were authentic, so Learner thought, the charge of
libel could not possibly stick.
Delitala countered this motion, arguing that regardless of the authenticity of the
documents, Guareschi’s stinging claims themselves had soiled De Gasperi’s reputation.
The court thus had one question before it and not two: ‘in questa sede l’imputato
Guareschi deve rispondere di un unico processo, e cioè di diffamazione a mezzo della
stampa e non pure di reato di falso’.24 The Pubblico Ministro also agreed that the case
before the court concerned libel and not malice.25 The tribunal overruled Lerner’s petition
to determine the veracity of the letters first before proceeding with the charge of libel.
The trial thus would specifically try Guareschi for libel and not render judgment on
whether or not the letters were authentic.
The direction the case took, as determined by the court with this decision, is
important for two primary reasons. First, in popular lore the case has always been seen as
having decisively determined that the letters were false. But, as the proceedings clearly
detail, the trial determined libel based on the essays that accompanied the letters. In the
end, the tribunal never officially determined the authenticity of the documents one way or
another.26 Second, with its decision, the court squarely placed the burden to establish that
the letters were authentic on Guareschi, who could only hope that the tribunal would later
accept his petition to have the letters examined. He faced an uphill battle. De Gasperi, on
the other hand, only had to convince the court that Guareschi’s words alone themselves
were libelous.
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In its formal introductory procedures (the interrogatorio), the court allowed
Guareschi to read a full explanation of his actions that detailed his long journalistic
interaction with De Gasperi as politician. Guareschi emphasized emphatically that he
aimed his diatribe at De Gasperi’s political position and not at his honor as an individual:
‘Non pubblicai le lettere in questione per diffamare De Gasperi in quanto esse sono di per
sé stesse la manifestazione di una normale azione di Guerra. [. . .] Io ho sempre criticato
sul mio giornale il “politicante” e non già l’uomo, che non mi interessava’.27 Guareschi
also explained how he came to possess the letters, communicating his awareness that the
documents in Mussolini’s dossier could have been fabricated and stating firmly that he
never would have published a part of such a file without the utmost certainty that the
letters were authentic. 28 He then responded to various questions posed by the court that
further detailed his understanding of how government agents had tried to acquire the
dossier since the end of the war.29
Alcide De Gasperi responded with his official deposition, carefully insisting that
he never could have written such letters since his seeking to have Rome bombed would
have been so unfathomable:
Insisto ancora nell’affermare che le due lettere pubblicate sul “Candido” sono
apocrife.
Io non ho mai tenuto alcuna corrispondenza con degli elementi anglo-americani.
È semplicemente assurdo che io allora, quale segretario della biblioteca del
Vaticano avrei usato della carta intestata per chiedere un’azione di bombardamento su
Roma, contrariamente ai quei principi a cui si informava tutta l’attività del Vaticano
stesso.
Le lettere di cui è causa non le ho mai scritte e voglio precisare che sono di un
contenuto completamente assurdo e ridicolo.
Non ho mai conosciuto il Col Bonham Carter, non solo, ma sconoscevo
completamente l’indirizzo di Salerno della base aerea degli Alleati. […]
Ripeto una volta che il contenuto delle lettere è illogico ed assurdo, perché
contrario al mio principio di uomo politico, non solo, ma non c’era alcun motivo che io
richiedessi il bombardamento della periferia di Roma quando la medesima città veniva
bombardata lo stesso, nonostante fosse stata dichiarata città aperta. [. . .] È ingenuo
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pensare che un uomo che ha avuto l’onore di governare l’Italia per sei-sette anni possa
avere la leggerezza di scrivere delle lettere del tenore come quelle di cui è causa.30
Once he established a moral alibi via his historical accomplishments, De Gasperi evoked
the sacred memory of the Resistance: ‘Se io avessi scritto le lettere in questione sarei
venuto meno a quegli obblighi che mi vincolavano al Comitato di Liberazione nazionale,
ed anche, come ho già detto, agli obblighi verso la S. Sede’.31 Thus, De Gasperi’s first
testimony relied heavily on establishing the improbability of his supposed action while
also summoning his role in a sacrosanct movement that had legitimated the Italian
democratic experience after the war.32
Through an interpreter, the court next heard testimony from retired Colonel
Arthur Desmond Bonham Carter who had flown in from England. He denied that he had
ever been stationed at Salerno in the Peninsular Base Section; he affirmed that he had
never heard of De Gasperi until after the war; and he swore that he had never received, at
any time, any form of communication whatsoever from him. 33
After listening to Bonham Carter, an interpreter read a letter from Field Marshal
Harold Alexander. He too stated he had never heard of De Gasperi until after the war and
explained how a request to bomb Rome in and of itself would have been extremely
unusual. Most requests he had received concerning the Eternal City aimed at the direct
opposite: ‘the alleged letter contains a request that Rome be bombed and suggests that
this request had been made previously. My recollection is that all requests reaching our
headquarters at that time on this subject were invariably to the effect that Rome should
not be bombed, and such records as I have been able to consult confirm this’.34
The court then called Bruno Stamm, the public notary, to testify. Stamm, who had
vouched for Focaccia’s expert opinion, affirmed that he had two letters in his possession
in Locarno, Switzerland — specifically the originals of the ones Guareschi had published

13
and no letter dated 12 January 1944 — and that he was ready to have them sent to the
Tribunal at a moment’s notice. With his statements, the first day’s proceedings ended.
The following day, 14 April 1954, proved decisive for the prosecution. Under
oath, De Gasperi recounted the facts relevant to how the government had made attempts
to ascertain if certain alleged documents from Mussolini’s files, in circulation since the
early 1950s, were authentic. He related that in 1953 investigators had traveled to
Switzerland and studied documents that purportedly compromised the integrity of certain
government officials. According to De Gasperi, an agent claimed that he had seen a series
of numbers on a letter dated 12 January with the Vatican letterhead, but that when he
checked with the Vatican’s official registry of correspondence, the numbers did not
match.35 De Gasperi further stated that the search for such documents had not been
undertaken as a result of an official mandate. 36
The tribunal then heard from Lerner who asked permission to interrogate six
witnesses that could refute De Gasperi’s claims. Specifically, Lerner wanted the court to
consider why several government agents had sought the documents and had even offered
money to purchase the documents in the dossier. Lerner wanted to establish that De
Gasperi feared that something in the dossier compromised him, thus establishing a reason
to believe the letters were authentic.37 More importantly, Lerner petitioned the court to
perform a chemical and handwriting examination of the two letters that had arrived from
Locarno under Stamm’s care.38
The proceedings had reached a crucial moment. Up until this point, De Gasperi
had attacked Guareschi by casting doubt of his ever having written the letters. De Gasperi
had not proven definitively, however, that he had not actually written them. With the
opportunity for scientific analysis, Guareschi would now have the chance to demonstrate
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how De Gasperi could plausibly have written the letters. But Delitala asked that all the
requests made by Guareschi be denied since, as he sustained, nothing would truly be
gained in granting them and the delay would further damage the moral character of his
client.39 Lerner countered, continuing to insist that scientific examination be undertaken.
Initially, the Pubblico Ministro agreed with the defendant.40At this
pronouncement, however, Delitala masterfully manipulated the sensibilities of the court,
expounding the implications that such an analysis would have for De Gasperi’s honor.
Referring to the testimony provided by Bonham Carter, he mused aloud what more proof
was necessary — ‘Che, si vuole di più dopo le prove decisive già fornite?’— and then
implored:
Mi rivolgo alla vostra coscienza e vi dico: se voi accettate la perizia calligrafica vuol dire
che avete ancora dei dubbi. Vuol dire che pensate che De Gasperi può anche averle
scritte. Vuol dire che non credete alla deposizione di Bonham Carter, alla lettera di
Alexander, che credete possibile l’assurdità del modo, dei tempi, dei luoghi in cui quelle
lettere avrebbero dovute essere scritte. E dopo non avere ritenute sufficienti le prove
puntuali oggettive che noi vi abbiamo fornito, crederete a una perizia? E se il perito dirà:
“Sembra, forse”? Capovolgerete il processo?41
Upon hearing these words, Guareschi knew he had lost the case. In the next
edition of Candido, he wrote:
L’argomentazione del Professore è formidabile: ordinare una perizia significa mettere in
dubbio il giuramento di De Gasperi. Significa esprimere pubblicamente il sospetto che
De Gasperi possa giurare il falso! [. . .]
Ecco la chiave del processo. [. . . .] l’avevo già capito dove volesse andare a finire
il Professore e già avevo dichiarato: “Stando così le cose si tratterà di un anno in
galera.”42
Delitala’s gambit wielded the fatal blow. At stake was which to believe -- the work of a
trained expert or the oath of an honorable statesman backed up by the word of two British
officers. The judges had to assume the responsibility of possibly finding that De Gasperi
had perjured himself, the very man who had nobly led Italy out of the tumultuous
dopoguerra and stood as a bulwark against the threat of communism.43
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After approximately an hour, the court reconvened and delivered its
pronouncement, rejecting Guareschi’s request to present his witnesses and submit the
letters to scientific analysis since they were deemed to be ‘del tutto inutili, essendo la
causa sufficientemente istruita ai fini del decidere’.44 In effect, the Court ruled that it was
not necessary to subject the letters to testing because De Gasperi, as a result of testimony
and witnesses presented, had so overwhelmingly shown the implausibility of his ever
having written the missives. As such, although it did not do so officially or directly, the
Court was saying that the letters were false without definite proof, effectively sacking any
further options for Lerner to defend Guareschi.
Lerner rose from his bench, publicly decried the ruling, removed his gown, and
stormed from the courtroom.45 The following day, the judges read the guilty verdict,
justifying their finding in the following way:
Dalle considerazioni di cui innanzi, anche senza tener conto dei dinieghi della
parte lesa che, per aver prestato giuramento, per il nostro sistema processuale, va creduta,
appare evidente che le lettere riportate sul “Candido” non possono essere che false.
La richiesta perizia grafica, con tutte le incertezze insite in tal genere di perizia,
non avrebbe potuto apportare alcun lume anche perché, nella migliore delle ipotesi per
l’imputato, una semplice affermazione del perito non avrebbe mai potuto fare diventare
credibile e certo, ciò che obiettivamente è risultato impossibile e inverosimile.
La perizia perciò non avrebbe detto nulla per quanto riguarda la prova del fatto
addebitato all’offeso e sarebbe soltanto servita a procrastinare una decisione che, con gli
elementi acquisiti, poteva e doveva già essere precisa.
Forse la perizia avrebbe potuto rivestire una certa utilità per altri fini e altre
persone ma ci troveremmo in un campo del tutto diverso da quello nel quale siamo tenuti
ad agire ed il Tribunale non ha la pretesa di fare la Storia mentre ha il diritto di rendere
giustizia a chi fiducioso gli si rivolge.46
Thus, while the Tribunal declared that De Gasperi had not written the letters, it
admitted at the same time that a scientific analysis might indeed reveal that he could
have. Yet the only way to arrive at that conclusion depended upon the chemical and
expert handwriting analysis that it had denied Guareschi. The last sentence appears both
ironic and contradictory since justice might not in fact have been done.
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A careful study of the Tribunal’s reasoning reveals the considerations that swayed
its opinion. We do well to read all seven in full as the Court listed them:
1.

Essere mai pensabile che si invii una lettera che dovrà attraversare il fronte, firmando
chiaramente tale lettera col proprio nome quando è notorio che nel periodo della
Resistenza tutti si celavano, ai fini della sicurezza personale dietro nomi
convenzionali?

2. Si legge nel “Candido” che le lettere furono affidate “ad un corriere che fu poi
catturato dalle forze fasciste fuori dalle sacre mura”; quindi lo stesso 19 gennaio 1944
i fascisti vennero in possesso di tale documento. Può credersi che un documento di
tale importanza, nel quale non si esitava a richiedere il bombardamento
dell’acquedotto, con tutte le prevedibili conseguenze, non fosse dai fascisti portato
subito, in mille modi, a conoscenza della popolazione romana per mettere, da una
parte, in cattiva luce le forze della resistenza ed i suoi modi subdoli di lotta e tentare,
dall’altra, di rialzare il loro traballante prestigio?
3. Nella lettera 19 gennaio 1944 si fa esplicito riferimento ad altra lettera datata 12
gennaio stesso anno, contenente le stesse richieste ed indirizzata alla stessa persona.
De Gasperi, per ripetere tale richiesta, evidentemente turbato dal ritardo, (si tratta, si
badi bene, di sette giorni soltanto e la lettera doveva essere recapitata oltre le linee)
doveva avere molto a cuore quanto chiedeva ed allora, perché mai servirsi di un
mezzo che si era dimostrato così insicuro quando nel Laterano era installata una radio
trasmettente attraverso la quale più celermente e più sicuramente avrebbe potuto
comunicare con le autorità alleate?
4. Nella lettera veniva esplicitamente chiesta un’azione di guerra; poteva essa azione
venire sostanzialmente chiesta da un privato cittadino? È notorio che le forze della
resistenza avevano una giunta militare che certamente avrebbe avuto più competenza
a rivolgere una richiesta del genere.
5. Nella lettera inviata dal Generale Alexander è chiaramente detto che una richiesta del
genere sarebbe stata presa in considerazione soltanto se fosse pervenuta agli Alleati
tramite il Maresciallo Badoglio: se una convenzione esisteva è logico che i membri
del C.L.N. ne fossero a conoscenza e quindi poteva mai pensare De Gasperi che la
sua richiesta avesse sortito un esito?
6. Il teste Bonham Carter, al quale era indirizzata la lettera, ha esplicitamente escluso di
essere stato applicato alla Peninsular Base Section di Salerno e soprattutto di
conoscere il De Gasperi firmatario della lettera del quale senti` parlare soltanto dopo
la totale liberazione del territorio nazionale. Né può pensarsi ad un errore di indirizzo,
in quanto dal tenore della lettera appare chiaro che tra i due era già in atto uno
scambio di corrispondenza; quindi il Carter ed il De Gasperi, sia pure per
corrispondenza, dovevano ben conoscersi, cosa invece smentita da entrambi.
7. Inutilità di richiedere delle azioni di guerra che, purtroppo, venivano già regolarmente
effettuate e che come dice il Gen. Alexander nella già ricordata lettera, erano
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continuamente oggetto di lagnanze da parte della autorità italiane e Vaticane. Del
resto risulta che lo acquedotto di Roma fin dal luglio 1943 aveva subito azioni di
bombardamento.47
Each point the court weighed surely influenced their opinion that the letters were false,
especially the testimony of the British witnesses that it viewed as most reliable. But in the
end, the points, taken separately or together as a whole, prove nothing.
As the venerable judge Giovanni Durando surmised in his 1994 memoir Io No!,
just because it was not comprehensible that a person could send a letter with a signature
bearing a name through the lines, we have no proof beyond a shadow of a doubt that De
Gasperi did not write the letter. Just because it was unthinkable that the Fascists would
not have immediately published the letters if they had captured them, we have no proof
beyond a shadow of a doubt that De Gasperi did not write the letters. Just because De
Gasperi had a radio transmitter at his disposal that he could have used to communicate
with the Allies, we have no proof beyond a shadow of a doubt that De Gasperi did not
write the letters—perhaps he chose to write the letters just the same. Just because it
seemed highly unlikely that De Gasperi as a private citizen could have asked the Allies to
bomb the aqueduct in Rome, we have no proof that he did not do so anyway. Just because
the letters did not come from Badoglio and the Allies would not have considered them
seriously, we cannot declare without doubt that De Gasperi did not write the letters. Just
because Bonham Carter testified that he was not stationed at the Peninsular Base Section
and did not know De Gasperi, we do not necessarily have proof that De Gasperi did not
write them anyway — perhaps he had the wrong address or perhaps he mistook one
Colonel Bonham Carter for another. Finally, just because, as Alexander testified in his
letter, it would have been pointless to ask the Allies to bomb Rome since they were
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attacking the city anyway, we have no proof that De Gasperi did not send a request just
the same.
The Public Minister’s explanation of why the Court denied scientific analysis
provides even more proof that it treated Guareschi unjustly: ‘Prima ancora che contro le
prove, i due ignobili pezzi di carta si sono sgretolati contro il luminoso alibi morale
dell’onorevole De Gasperi’.48 This assertion, too, is noteworthy, for in a very intriguing
way it mirrors what De Gasperi’s wife Francesca had voiced prior to the beginning of the
trial: ‘Io non capisco perché debbano fare la perizia, quando mio marito ha affermato di
non aver mai scritto quei documenti’.49 In light of De Gasperi’s moral alibi, why did the
tribunal not consider Guareschi’s moral alibi as well?
The actual punishment the court meted out obliged Guareschi to spend one year in
prison and pay the fine of 100,000 lire along with the costs of the proceedings.50 He also
had to pay the symbolic sum of one lira to De Gasperi in reparation for the damage done
to his reputation and to publish the sentence twice in Candido.51 The court also added
eight months of prison time for the suspended sentence of the Einaudi affair. Upon
hearing the outcome of the trial, several of Guareschi’s detractors, including Eugenio
Montale, toasted the court’s decision and reveled in Guareschi’s defeat.52
Guareschi accepted the sentence but not the unfair process in his opinion that lead
to it. Thus, in an impassioned article, he explained to his readers that he would refuse to
appeal:
No, niente Appello.
Qui non si tratta di riformare una sentenza ma un costume. La sentenza è regolare,
ha il crisma della legalità. Il costume è sbagliato, e non è una questione che riguardi la
Magistratura: è una questione di carattere generale, che riguarda l’Italia intera.
Non è un colpo di testa: io non ho il temperamento dell’aspirante eroe o
dell’aspirante martire. [. . .]
In tutta questa faccenda hanno tenuto conto dell’alibi morale di De Gasperi e non
si è neppure ammesso che io possegga un alibi morale.
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Quarantacinque o quarantasei anni di vita pulita, di lavoro onesto, non sono un
luminoso alibi morale?
Me l’hanno negato.
Hanno negato tutta la mia vita, tutto quello che io ho fatto nella mia vita.
Non si può accettare un sopruso di questo genere. [. . .]
Vado in prigione. Accetto la condanna come accetterei un pugno in faccia: non mi
interessa dimostrare che m’è stato dato ingiustamente. Il pugno l’ho già preso e nessuno
potrà far sì che io non l’abbia preso.
Non mi pesa la condanna in sé, ma il modo.
E il modo ancor m’offende.53
He continued venting his frustration about the ‘tribunale rivoluzionario’ he had just
faced. Then, he said he would gladly take up his old rucksack and enter prison: ‘Niente di
teatrale, niente di drammatico. Tutto semplice e naturale. Per rimanere liberi bisogna, a
un bel momento, prendere senza esitare la via della prigione’.54
Guareschi spent 409 days in Parma’s San Francesco prison.55 He spent another six
months on probation, confined to his home in Roncole. When he had finally served all his
time, he returned as editor of Candido and continued his vigorous political satire. From
time to time, whenever the question of the authenticity of the letters resurfaced in the
public sphere, Guareschi would restate his belief that the letters were authentic. He
believed that the mass media condemned him mistakenly for having published false
letters, and he did his best to discredit the charge.
III. Persistent Misinterpretations:
Misconstrued appraisals of Guareschi’s sentence and refusal to appeal began
immediately. The day after the trial, as Guareschi reported in Candido, the official
newspaper of the Christian Democrats, Il Popolo, proclaimed in its broad head: ‘Le
lettere attribuite a De Gasperi sono false! Un anno di reclusione al diffamatore
Guareschi’.56 Over the years, journalists and historians have repeated this same claim.
We have, for example, already seen what the official history of the Democrazia Cristiana
reports. Other instances include the following taken from various publications:
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La pubblicazione di alcune lettere, che si rivelarono essere false, in cui si accusava De
Gasperi di aver invocato durante la Resistenza i bombardamenti angloamericani su
Roma, fece scattare la denuncia e il processo contro lo stesso scrittore, condannato a un
anno di carcere [. . .].57
Si tratta di una causa per diffamazione intentata dal leader democristiano contro il
direttore del «Candido» Giovanni Guareschi, reo di aver diffuso un documento del 1944,
falso, in cui De Gasperi avrebbe chiesto agli Alleati di bombardare l’acquedotto di Roma
[. . .]. 58
Guareschi nel ’54 pubblicò sul «Candido» una presunta lettera di De Gasperi che risaliva
al gennaio del ’44, e con la quale questi avrebbe invitato gli Alleati a bombardare Roma.
L’aveva comprata da un trafficone, ma si trattava di un falso, come dichiarò il tribunale
[. . . ].59
L’appunto sulle confidenze di «tale Patrizio» ricorda la vicenda di De Gasperi e delle
false lettere pubblicate da Guareschi, quando si temeva che lo statista si candidasse al
Quirinale, dopo la sconfitta del ’55.60
Apart from the mistaken belief that the letters had been declared false, other distortions
surround Guareschi’s decision not to seek an appeal.
Esteemed journalists Indro Montanelli and Enzo Biagi, for example, have both
stated that, after he had served his time, Guareschi later admitted to them that he had
made a mistake and wanted to atone for his error by serving out his sentence.61 Giulio
Andreotti also suggested something similar. Writing in a letter to a lawyer, who in 1996
attempted to help Guareschi’s children possibly have the sentence officially overturned,
the senator stated: ‘Uno dei miei collaboratori aveva ottime relazioni con Guareschi
[. . .] Mi disse dopo aver parlato più volte con Giovannino di avere la certezza che il
carattere fiero del personaggio lo avesse indotto a subire il carcere, pur essendosi
convinto di essere stato tratto in inganno’.62 At a later time, Andreotti stated that for him,
Bonham Carter’s testimony was the decisive piece of evidence that influenced the court:
‘La presenza come teste del Bonham Carter fu un elemento decisivo per smontare
l’accusa. [. . .] Guareschi per quel che so era stato tratto in inganno, poi per fierezza non
volle riconoscerlo’.63
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To his dying days, however, Guareschi continually hammered home the point that
he still considered the letters to be authentic. For example, in 1959 a journalist reported
that Guareschi was the person ‘che sposò la causa dei documenti falsi di Enrico De
Toma’. Guareschi retorted: ‘Ciò è inesatto: io sposai la causa di due lettere autentiche a
me affidate — perché ne disponessi gratuitamente come meglio credevo — dal De Toma.
Non sposai la causa dei “documenti falsi” di Enrico De Toma’.64 A few years earlier, he
had answered the notion that he wanted to serve jail time in order to expiate his sins and
undertake penance with these words: ‘Dopo il Referendum, salutando il mio Re che
partiva per l’esilio, ho dichiarato che, pure non accettandola, mi impegnavo a subire la
Repubblica così come, più avanti, pur non accettando una condanna da me ritenuta
ingiusta, ho subito il carcere rifiutando sdegnosamente di appellarmi’.65
IV. Conclusion:
Because so many distortions of De Gasperi v. Guareschi have crystallized in the
collective imagination over the last fifty years, an informed scholarly community
deserves to know the facts that the official proceedings detail. The Milan tribunal that
convicted Giovannino Guareschi of libel counted heavily upon the British evidence
provided by Bonham Carter and Alexander, and it also held De Gasperi’s moral alibi in
highest regard. Common sense dictated that De Gasperi could never have written those
letters. For many scholars, the same judgment still holds true today. De Gasperi’s
accomplishments alone prove that he was certainly no thug, no common crook. On the
contrary, in many respects by the time of the trial, he had already laid legitimate claim to
be a true Italian political hero.
Indeed, scholars stand on solid ground in surmising that the letters Guareschi
reproduced were forgeries even if they recognize that the judges, in many aspects,
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conducted the trial unreasonably. Simply put, Guareschi’s accusation was, and remains,
too farfetched and scandalous to be plausible. The claim would find an analogy with an
American journalist who accused Eisenhower of child molestation. The fact that
Guareschi challenged Italy’s greatest statesman on the grounds he presented indicates a
disastrous failure of judgment.
Regardless of the claim, however, it is quite evident that the Court short-changed
Guareschi and on three accounts did not give him full measure of proof to confute De
Gasperi’s counter allegation that the letters were forgeries. First, the judges refused to
hear from six defense witnesses who were ready to bolster Guareschi’s case. Second,
they never discussed at length why the government had spent so much time seeking to
recover documents if officials, as De Gasperi explained, had deemed them as bogus.
Third, the judges did not allow the letters to be submitted for testing.
Admittedly, the Tribunal did face an almost impossible task — that of trying to
determine definitively the paternity of a document through scientific analysis, an inexact
operation that always leaves room for further confutation and debate. But in deciding not
to undertake that endeavor, the Court capsized Guareschi’s most essential line of defense
and discarded his own moral alibi. As the proceedings document, Guareschi’s assault
upon the rectitude of Italy’s most famous statesman seemed to threaten the stability of the
State itself. 66 In the thick of the Cold War, the Christian Democrat Party, sustained by the
United States and the Vatican, had become a political juggernaut. It had achieved a status
that placed its leadership seemingly above reproach. Guareschi could never have gained
the same admiration the judges held for De Gasperi.
To counter misreckoning about the case and acquire an accurate understanding of
how Alcide De Gasperi sent Giovannino Guareschi to jail, we must attentively study the
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court proceedings and evaluate them with Guareschi’s own commentary upon the events.
Guareschi opted for imprisonment and did not seek an appeal precisely because he
recognized the court’s failures laid forth above, not because he wanted to atone for any
error. Until his untimely death in 1968, he continued to retain that the letters he had
published were authentic, and even if a determination of their paternity would have been
ultimately unattainable, the Court never definitively proved that the letters were false.
Gettysburg College
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